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1 Introduction
High and persistent European unemployment has given rise to a number of
economic policy advice programmes directed to reduce the structural causes
of joblessness. Most of these programmes include suggestions to mitigate
the tax burden on labour, in particular on low-income wage earners (see for
example EU, 2000 and EEAG, 2002). Similar targets have been adopted by
national governments as, for example, a recent evaluation study shows for the
case of Finland (Ministry of Labour, 2002). A typical policy package along
these lines would increase the tax allowances on earned income and thereby
mitigate the taxation of low-wage workers. The idea that cutting labour taxes
might help to bring down unemployment also nds support in some recent
economic studies. A frequently cited example is Prescott (2004), who argues
that higher labour taxation is capable of explaining the poor employment
performance of the major European countries when compared to the United
States.
As we read it, neither of these approaches puts much emphasis on the
wage setting and the country di¤erences in the related institutions. In the
advice programmes, the recommendation for cutting taxes especially among
low-paid workers, is traditionally justied by their presumably higher labour
supply and demand elasticities (see e.g. CEPR, 1995). In Prescotts analysis,
the wages are assumed to be determined in a competitive manner and no
institutional di¤erences between countries are allowed for. The conclusion is
that marginal tax rates should be cut in Europe.
The negligence of wage setting is somewhat unsatisfactory given the rel-
atively large literature on the importance of the wage formation in trans-
mitting the e¤ects of the tax policy on the employment outcomes. This lit-
erature, focusing on the imperfectly competitive labour markets, has shown
that the e¤ects of taxation greatly depend on the prevailing wage setting
mechanism. The two most widely used wage setting frameworks utilized in
these studies are union models (e.g. Hersoug, 1984, Koskela and Vilmunen,
1996 and Hansen et al., 2000) and e¢ ciency wage models (e.g. Hoel, 1990,
Pisauro,1991 and Sörensen, 1999). One of the key ndings is that - di¤erent
from the competitive set-up - a pure increase in the tax progression may lead
to wage moderation and thereby improve employment. This result, which
has found support in a number of empirical studies such as Lockwood and
Manning, (1993), Holmlund and Kolm (1995), Aronsson et al., (1997) and -
more recently - Schneider (2005), has been more rigorously developed in the
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union models. In the e¢ ciency wage models, the results concerning the de-
sireability of tax progression are somewhat more mixed (see e.g. Rasmussen,
1998). Recently labor taxation has been analyzed also in the search theoretic
framework by e.g. Pissarides (1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides (2002).
The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to this discussion by
considering the e¤ects of labor taxation and tax progression in a search equi-
librium model with endogenous job creation and job destruction. In partic-
ular, we want to nd out how alternative assumptions of wage setting a¤ect
the employment outcomes. For that purpose, we consider three alternative
hypotheses of wage determination: the Nash bargain, monopoly unionand
e¢ ciency wages1. Our analysis identies two potentially important reasons
for a more careful modelling of wage setting in the tax policy analysis: First,
di¤erences in the wage setting mechanisms can explain why European coun-
tries may be able bear a higher tax burden on labor and why tax cuts alone
would not necessarily bring European unemployment down to the U.S. level.
This is particularly so, if the European labor market can be characterized by
wage bargaining and the U.S. by e¢ ciency-wage-type of pay setting. Second,
the positive employment e¤ects of tax progression in the case of noncompet-
itive wage setting may provide another justication for the tax allowances
of the low-income workers even if labor demand elasticities would not dif-
fer systematically between income groups. This view is highlighted by the
fact that tax allowances already constitute a remarkable source of progres-
sivity in personal income taxation in the OECD-countries (Wagsta¤ and van
Doorslaer, 2001).
In our model, originating from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the job
destruction decision is made endogenous by assuming that the lled vacancies
are subject to a stochastic and idiosyncratic productivity shock with a given
probability distribution. This allows us to consider the e¤ects of taxation at
two separate margins: the job creation and the job destruction. As for the tax
instruments, our analysis covers proportional and progressive tax on labor
income as well as a proportional payroll tax. The inclusion of alternative
widely used models of non-competitive wage setting enables an interesting
comparison between them and allows us to consider to what extent the results
derived in the static models carry over to the search equilibrium framework.
1We write monopoly unionin quotation marks because - as discussed in more detail
below - our specication due to Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) di¤ers somewhat from
the standard meaning of the term. The exact assumptions of the alternative wage setting
models is discussed in more detail below.
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Furthermore, as noted by Pissarides (1998), the inclusion of alternative wage
setting mechanisms in the tax policy analysis can be justied by the lack of
a denitive model for the European labor market.
We nd, not surprisingly, that labor taxes have a harmful e¤ect on the
steady state employment, irrespective of the wage formation mechanism2.
The adverse e¤ect is mainly due to reduced labor market tightness and the
consequent increase in the unemployment duration. However, the magnitude
of the e¤ect varies, depending on the wage setting specication. In particu-
lar, employment turns out to be much less sensitive to taxation in the models
involving wage bargaining. Our results also suggest that increased tax pro-
gression may improve employment with low or even non-existent e¢ ciency
cost if wages are set in a bargaining framework. Moreover, we argue that in
these models tax progression increases the take-home pay of low-productivity
workers and promotes the emergence of less productive jobs.
The present paper extends the existing literature by considering the ef-
fects of tax progression in a model with endogenous job destruction and
by analyzing the robustness of this relationship to alternative assumptions
concerning the wage setting mechanism. Our approach is closely related to
Pissarides (1998), who compares the e¤ects of labor taxes and tax progres-
sion within alternative models of the labor market including a stylized search
model. However, our analysis is cast in a search equilibrium with endoge-
nous job destruction and is thereby more general3. Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) and (2002) provide an analysis of labor taxation in a model with en-
dogenous job destruction and standard Nash bargain over wages, but do
not consider the e¤ects of tax progression. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
introduce alternative models of wage formation, but do not analyze their
implications for the e¤ects of tax policies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model and the alternative models of wage determination. Section 3 presents
2There are some recent studies with opposite results: Altenburg and Straub (2002)
show that proportional labour taxes can actually improve employment in a combined
e¢ ciency wage and union bargaining framework. Their result stems from decomposing
the e¤ective labour input into (endogenous) e¤ort and employment. Kilponen and Sinko
(2005) nd a positive employment e¤ect of proportinal labour income tax in a monopoly
union model with an individual supply of working hours. Their nding is conditional on
centralised wage setting and high enough marginal utility of publicly provided goods.
3On the other hand, we do not explicitly consider the role of unemployment benets
and their indexation as Pissarides does, but implicitly conne ourselves to the case where
unemployment benets are xed in real terms.
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simulations of tax policy e¤ects in alternative model specications. A sum-
mary of the results and some concluding remarks are presented in section 4.
Some of the technical details are presented in the appendices A-D.
2 The Model
The framework of our analysis is a model of equilibrium unemployment
with endogenous job creation and job destruction originally presented in
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)4. In the model, the job destruction deci-
sion is made endogenous by assuming that the lled vacancies are subject
to a stochastic and idiosyncratic productivity shock with a given probability
distribution. The shock arrives at a xed Poisson rate. The rm then chooses
an endogenous reservation productivity R and destroys the jobs whose pro-
ductivity falls below that threshold.
A remarkable di¤erence to the standard model with exogenous job de-
struction (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000, Chapter 1) is that now jobs are het-
erogeneous with respect to productivity. At any point of time there is a
continuum of lled vacancies whose productivity lies in the range between
the reservation productivity and the highest attainable productivity. It is
assumed - consistently with free entry and prot maximizing behavior - that
a new match always has the highest productivity. For simplicity, the highest
productivity is normalized to unity.
In our basic model, the wage rate of a job is determined in a decentralized
Nash bargain once the match is formed, and subsequently renegotiated after
each productivity shock. In what follows, we introduce labor income taxation
to this basic model and derive the equilibrium with taxes. We then proceed
to consider the e¤ects of taxation under two alternative hypotheses of wage
determination: the monopoly union (section 2.5) and the e¢ ciency wage
(section 2.6) settings.
4Our basic model deviates to some extent from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). For
example, we do not allow for a general productivity shock, bacause it is less interesting
for the issue at hand. Our notation follows closely that of Pissarides (2000), Chapter 2.
4
2.1 Individuals
Since jobs are only created at the highest productivity level (x = 1) the
expected present value of unemployment search U is dened by
rU = b  a+m () (W (1)  U) (1)
where b is the value of leisure or home production, a is the net cost of
search per period, r is the discount rate of interest andW (1) is the expected
present value of a work o¤er. Furthermore, the endogenous probability of
encountering a vacancy m (), is a function of the labor market tightness de-
ned as the ratio of vacancies to the number of the unemployed   v=u. As
usual, we assume a constant returns to scale matching technology implying
m0 () > 0; m00 () < 05. For a worker employed in a job with productivity x
we have
rW (x) = (1  t)w (x)  g + 
Z 1
0
max (W (z) ; U) dF (z) W (x)

(2)
where w is the wage rate and  is the exogenous probability of an idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock. The distribution of the shock is captured by a
cumulative density function F (x), F 0(x) > 0, dened over the interval [0; 1].
After a shock, the worker either continues working in a job with a new pro-
ductivity level or becomes unemployed if the value of the job falls below that
of unemployment search i.e. W (x) < U . Furthermore, g and t are income
tax parameters such that the income tax paid by an employed worker per
period is
T = g + tw(x) (3)
For t > 0, g = 0 implies a tax schedule that is proportional to income. With
g < 0 (g > 0) taxation is progressive (regressive) in the sense that average
tax rate increases (decreases) with income6. Parameter g can be interpreted
as a tax credit or a lump tax, respectively. The after tax wage or take-home
pay of a job with productivity x is then given by (1  t)w(x)  g7.
5To be exact,m is the matching function divided by the number of unemployed. Petron-
golo and Pissarides (2001) provide more discussion on the theoretical underpinnings of
matching functions and a survey on the empirical evidence.
6See e.g. Lambert (2001). For the alternative denions of tax progression see Musgrave
and Thin (1948).
7An alternative and essentially identical specication to capture a potentially progres-
sive taxation would be T = t (w(x)  c), where c is a lump-sum allowance rather than a
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2.2 Firms
Since jobs are created at the highest productivity level, the value of a vacancy
V is given by
rV =  c+ q () (J (1)  V ) (4)
where c is the cost of a vacancy per period, q () =  1m () is the probabil-
ity of encountering an unemployed worker and J (1) is the value of a lled
vacancy. The value of a lled vacancy with productivity x is given by
rJ (x) = x  (1 + s)w (x) + 
Z 1
0
max (J (z) ; V ) dF (z)  J(x)

(5)
where s is the proportional payroll tax levied on the employer. Notice that
the expected duration of a vacancy is determined simply by 1=q (). Di¤er-
entiating then allows us to dene the elasticity of the expected duration of a
vacancy with respect to the number of vacancies "  @ log (1=q ()) =@ log v,
that turns out to be important determinant of the e¢ ciency of the model
equilibrium8.
2.3 Nash Bargain on Wages
The standard assumption in this class of models is that the surplus asso-
ciated with a job match is shared between the workers and the rms in a
decentralized Nash bargain over wages. Workers and rms are assumed to
be smallin the sense that they do not consider the e¤ects of their action
on aggregate variables, in particular on the value of unemployment search
and the value of vacancies. Given the transferable utility between the two
parties, a Nash bargain guarantees the individual rationality of job destruc-
tion decisions (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). In our notation, the match
specic Nash wage is determined by
w (x) = argmax (W (x)  U) (J (x)  V )1  (6)
where 0 <  < 1 is an exogenous parameter reecting the relative bargaining
powerof the worker. In the absence of further information it is natural (and
tax credit. With c > 0 (c < 0 )taxation would be progressive (regressive) with respect to
before-tax income.
8It is straightforward to show that in the special case of a Cobb-Douglas matching
technology, " > 0 will be constant.
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standard) to assume the symmetric case where  equals one half. It can be
shown (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000) that if  happens to coincide with the
elasticity of the expected duration of a vacancy with respect to the number
of vacancies ( = "), the equilibrium produced by the model with no taxes
is socially e¢ cient. This result holds for homogenous of degree one matching
functions and is referred to as the Hosios condition (Hosios, 1990)9.
The rst order condition related to (6) can be written in the form (see
Appendix A for details)
W (x)  U
J (x)  V +W (x)  U =
 (1  t)
(1 + s)   (s+ t) (7)
where the numerator of the left hand side, W (x)   U is the surplus of a
worker and the denominator J (x)   V +W (x)   U is the total surplus of
a match. Expression (7) thus conveniently shows the e¤ect of taxes on the
workers relative share of the surplus from a match. Di¤erentiating the right
hand side shows that an increase in either of the proportional tax rates, s or
t, reduces the workers relative share. Intuitively, this is because taxes that
are proportional to wages induce a common incentive to wage moderation for
the worker and the rm, as noticed by Pissarides (2000). The per head tax
g does not have this property and only a¤ects the total surplus thus leaving
the relative shares una¤ected. Therefore, g is absent from the right hand side
of (7). Also notice that in the absence of taxes the workers share is simply
determined by .
2.4 Equilibrium with Taxes
In the model with endogenous job destruction, the ow of workers into un-
employment is dictated by F (R) (1  u). The ow of workers out of unem-
ployment through the matching process is determined by m ()u: Equating
the two ows allows us to solve for the steady state rate of unemployment as
follows
u =

1 +
m ()
F (R)
 1
(8)
9Satisfaction of the Hosios condition implies that the externalities related to the search
are internalised in the wage setting. This is not generally the case under the Nash bargain
(Pissarides, 2000).
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With m0 () ; F 0 (R) > 0; equation (8) shows that the equilibrium rate of
unemployment decreases in the labor market tightness and increases in the
reservation productivity10.
The labor market equilibrium can be dened by imposing the conditions
for free entry and mutual acceptance of job destruction. Free entry for rms
is assumed to bring the value of a vacancy to zero
V = 0 (9)
With (9) holding, the mutual acceptance of job destruction implies11
W (R)  U = J (R) = 0 (10)
It takes some algebra (see Appendix B) to show that after introduction of
the two conditions (9) and (10) we can express the equilibrium as a solution
to a set of two independent equations in the labor market tightness and the
reservation productivity. The rst one,
(1 + s)
(1  t) (b  a+ g) +
c
(1  ) = R +

(r + )
Z 1
R
(z  R) dF (z) (11)
is the job destruction condition in the presence of taxation and constitutes an
upward sloping curve in (;R) space. For given labor market tightness, (11)
implies a positive relationship between the tax parameters and the reservation
productivity. Thus, an increase in any of the tax parameters implies an
upward shift of the curve. The second equation,
c =
1  
r + 
q () (1 R) (12)
is the job creation condition and constitutes a downward sloping curve in
(; R) space. The labor market equilibrium in the presence of taxation is
characterized by the labor market tightness and reservation productivity de-
termined by the two equations (11) and (12). It is worth noting that the tax
instruments do not enter the job creation condition (12). In other words,
10Equation (8) can also be interpreted as the equation of the Beveridge curve, as shown
in Pissarides (2000).
11Alternatively, (10) follows from (7) and (9) and the condition that total surplus from
a match is zero at the reservation productivity i.e. J (R)  V +W (R)  U = 0:
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with a given labor market tightness, the reservation productivity is su¢ cient
to transmit the e¤ects of the tax changes to a job creation decision based on
the free entry condition (9).
Figure 1 E¤ect of higher labour taxes in the model with the Nash bargain
on wages: the upward sloping job destruction schedule shifts up and to the
left with a consequent drop in the labour market tightness (v/u) and an
increase in the reservation productivity R.
The e¤ects of exogenous changes in the tax rates can be presented dia-
grammatically in the (;R) space: An increase in either of the tax parameters
shifts the job destruction schedule to the left, whereas the job creation sched-
ule remains stable12. Consequently, labor market tightness drops and reser-
vation productivity increases in response to higher taxation (Figure 1). With
the help of equations (7) and (B.3) it is then straightforward to show that
the value of a lled vacancy J(x) as well as the workers surplus (W (x) U)
decline owing to higher taxes. Consequently, the total surplus of a match
with productivity x is reduced. As for the wage rate, rearranging equation
12Using the job destruction condition (11) it is straightforward to show that the intro-
duction of either a proportional tax on income or a proportional payroll tax has identical
e¤ects on the equilibrium if the rates are chosen such that (1 + s) = (1  t) 1. Thus, the
so-called wedge argument (see Layard et al.,1991) applies and the real e¤ects of the two
taxes are independent of the nominal incidence.
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(B.8) reveals that an increase in any of the three tax parameters unambigu-
ously reduces the after tax wage (1  t)w(x)   g: With reference to (8), it
is equally clear that an increase in any of the tax parameters leads to an
increased ow into unemployment and a reduced ow out of unemployment
at the initial level of employment and consequently, into a higher rate of un-
employment in the steady state. These ndings can be summarized by the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the model where wages are determined in a standard de-
centralized Nash bargain between rms and workers, an increase in propor-
tional or per head labor tax causes an increase in the reservation productivity
R and a decline in the labor market tightness . Consequently, workers
share of the match surplus and the after tax wage decline and equilibrium
unemployment increases.
The results stated in Proposition 1 are in line with the ndings of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999), who show that an increase in the proportional payroll
tax increases reservation productivity and reduces labor market tightness and
Mortensen and Pissarides (2002), who show that the per head labor income
tax has similar e¤ects.
Following Pissarides (2000), it is straightforward to show that the equi-
librium with taxes is socially e¢ cient if the matching technology satises the
Hosios condition  = " already discussed above, and the tax parameters are
chosen to satisfy the following condition
g =
  (b  a) (s+ t)
1 + s
(13)
which in e¤ect makes (11) equal to the case with no taxes. For an inter-
pretation of (13), it is helpful to notice that the per head tax g essentially
corresponds to a subsidy to leisure or home production. What (13) then
states is that if the value of home production net of search cost (b   a) is
subsidized at a rate equal to the e¤ective tax rate on wages, the overall tax
system is neutral with respect to job creation and destruction. However, if
 6= " the no tax equilibrium is ine¢ cient and full e¢ ciency cannot be
restored with the available tax instruments13.
13If  6= ", an approriate combination of the tax instruments can, however, improve
e¢ ciency over the no tax equilibrium, as we will show below in one of the numerical
simulations.
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2.5 Monopoly Union Wage Setting
In the basic model above, we employed the standard assumption of search
models that wages are an outcome of a Nash bargain between rms and
workers. When setting the wage, rms and workers took the action of other
agents, and therefore the aggregate variables, as given. Also, the parameter
 reecting workers bargaining power and relative share of the surplus was
exogenously xed.
In this section, we consider an alternative model of wage setting that
involves an endogenous determination of . In particular, we employ the
monopoly unionformulation suggested by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
where - in order to preserve the individual rationality of job destruction - the
monopolistic bargaining position of a trade union is captured by allowing the
union to decide upon the value of  rather than directly dictate the wage
rate. When setting ; the union takes full account of the implications of its
act for the decisions made by the individual agents, that is the workers and
rms engaged in the job matching. After  has been set, the Nash wage
rule (6) applies to the individual matches and rms and workers respond by
making the appropriate job creation and destruction decisions.
Having stated the basic structure of the problem, we are left with the
determination of the unions objective. Importantly, Pissarides (2000) shows
that if the workers share parameter was set to maximize the expected utility
of an unemployed worker, it would be chosen to be equal to the elasticity of
the expected duration of a vacancy with respect to the number of vacancies.
Thus, the Hosios condition would be satised and the equilibrium would be
e¢ cient. Though theoretically important, this is hardly a realistic objective
for a workersunion.
We employ, perhaps more realistically, the approach suggested byMortensen
and Pissarides (1999), where the objective of the union is to maximize the
expected utility of a median member (see also Booth, 1995). With more
than half of the members working, the median member will be an employed
worker. Utilizing the notation introduced in the previous section, we can
apply equations (7), (9) and (B.3) to write down the value function of the
median worker
W (xm) = U +
(1  t)  (xm  R)
(r + ) (1 + s)
(14)
where xm > R is the productivity of the job held by the median member.
According to (14), the value of a job held by the median member is a mark-up
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over the value of unemployment search U . The size of the mark-up increases
in the job productivity xm as well as in the workers share parameter ;
and decreases in the reservation productivity R. Intuitively, high reservation
productivity renders jobs less secure and thereby reduces the premium over
unemployment experienced by those holding a job.
The problem of the union is then to maximize the right hand side of (14)
with respect to , taking account of the indirect e¤ect through U and R as
implied by the underlying model of matching behavior by workers and rms.
Di¤erentiating (14) with respect to  and setting equal to zero yields the
rst order condition for the union optimum
@W (xm)
@
=
@U
@
+
(1  t)
(r + ) (1 + s)

(xm  R)  @R
@

= 0 (15)
To develop (15) further, we need to derive suitable expressions for U and
R, respectively. To facilitate this, we assume that matching technology is
of Cobb-Douglas type i.e. m ()   and the productivity shock is evenly
distributed in the interval ]0; 1[ (see Appendix C). Starting with U , we apply
equation (B.4) to derive
rU + g =
(1  t)
(1 + s)
2Rr + R2 + 
2 (r + )
(16)
which reects the positive relationship between the value of unemployment
search U and the reservation productivity R: The unemployed are, ce-
teris paribus, better o¤ when the reservation productivity is high, jobs are
volatile and the di¤erence between unemployment and employment is rel-
atively small. Solving (16) explicitly for U , di¤erentiating with respect to
 and substituting for @U=@ into (15) allows us to rewrite the rst order
condition as follows
(1  t) (xm  R)
(r + ) (1 + s)
+
(1  t) (R + (1  ) r)
r (r + ) (1 + s)
@R
@
= 0 (17)
Equation (17) conveniently decomposes the e¤ect of  on the median
workers utility into a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect through R: The
rst positive term on the left hand side accounts for the direct e¤ect of a
higher workers share that increases with productivity of the median worker
xm. The second term reects the induced change in reservation productivity
and thus in the "job security" experienced by the median worker. Since the
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other two terms in the left hand side of (17) are strictly positive, we can
conclude that @R
@
< 0, at the unions optimum.
To derive an expression for @R
@
, we rst utilize (11) and (12) to derive
(1  ) (1 R)
r + 

R (2r +R) +  (s; t; g)
2 (r + ) c
 (1 )
= c (18)
where (s; t; g)     2 (1 + s) (1  t) 1 (r + ) (b  a+ g) is a constant in-
corporating the tax parameters. Equation (18) thus implicitly denes R as a
function of . For a plausible choice or parameters it traces a concave curve
in the ;R -space. Applying the implicit function rule to (18) we then nd
@R
@
=
(1    ) (1 R)
 (1  )  1 + 2 (2Rr +R2 +(s; t; g)) 1 (1  ) (1 R) (R + r)
(19)
where the denominator is positive for a reasonable range of values of the
reservation productivity. Equation (19) denes the response of the rms
reservation productivity to a marginal increase in the workersshare. Notice
that setting the right hand side of (19) equal to zero implies  = 1 , which
constitutes the Hosios condition in the present set-up with Cobb-Douglas
matching technology and (13) holding. This notion reects the property of
the underlying model that the reservation productivity achieves its maximum
at the social optimum (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999)14. For the present
set-up, @R
@
< 0 implies that  > 1   . In other words,  is higher, and
consequently, the reservation productivity R is lower, than would be socially
optimal.
14Also notice that letting xm ! R in (17) produces the case of the unemployed median
member as a limiting outcome and implies @R@ = 0 at the optimum. This reproduces
the result of Pissarides (2000) that the unemployed workers optimum coincides with the
e¢ cient outcome.
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Figure 2 The equilibrium of the monopoly union case depicted in the
(;R) space. The reservation productivity RM is lower and the workers
share M is higher than in the e¢ cient outcome (
; R). An increase in
the median voters productivity induces a rightward shift in the downward
sloping locus dened by (20) and increases the deviation from e¢ ciency.
Finally, substituting (19) for @R
@
in (17) and some manipulation yields
2 (1  ) (1 R) (R + r)
2Rr + R2 +(s; t; g)
=
R (1  )  xm + (1     )

R(R 1)
r(1 )   1

 (xm  R)
(20)
where (s; t; g) is as dened above in connection to (18). Equation (20)
denes a locus in (;R)- space that satises the "monopoly union condition".
Assuming that the second order condition is satised, the locus is downward
sloping. Intuitively, high reservation productivity implies less secure jobs and
induces the median worker to put more weight on the value of unemployment
search and less to the premium while working. Therefore she/he prefers lower
workers share .
The labor market equilibrium (;R; ) under the monopoly union regime
is dened by the equations (11), (12), (20). The wage rate is then determined
by (B.8). Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium in the ;R -space as an intersection
of the of the two curves dened by equations (18) and (20). By di¤erentiating
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(20) with respect to xm and  it is possible to show that an increase in the
median voters productivity induces a rightward shift of the locus, causing
an increase in  and a further reduction in R (see Figure 2). We summarize
these ndings by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In the model where a monopoly union maximizes the utility of a
median member, the parameter  reecting the workers share in the Nash
bargain is set above the socially e¢ cient level. This implies lower reservation
productivity and insu¢ cient job destruction in the equilibrium. The deviation
from e¢ ciency increases with the productivity of the median member.
Lemma 1 adds to the ndings of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), who
argue that, in general, the monopoly union formulation leads to a higher
workers share and a lower reservation productivity than would be socially
optimal. Intuitively, employed median worker does not fully accommodate
the implications of a low reservation productivity on the unemployed and
therefore chooses a workers share higher than would be socially optimal.
When setting ; the union aims at equating the immediate gain from a higher
workers share to the indirect loss due to a lower reservation productivity.
Since, as reected in (17), the immediate gain from higher  for the median
worker is proportional to the di¤erence between his/her productivity and the
reservation productivity, the deviation from e¢ ciency is the larger, the larger
is xm.
As for the e¤ects of taxation, di¤erentiating (18) with respect to the tax
parameters for a given  shows that higher taxes cause an upward shift in
the curve. Similarly, di¤erentiation of (20) shows that an increase in one
of the tax parameters causes a shift to the right of this locus. Thus, we
cannot infer the e¤ect of higher taxation on reservation productivity and on
the workers share parameter. Consequently, and di¤erent from the standard
model, the e¤ect of taxes on the labor market tightness  as well as on
wages and employment remain a priori ambiguous under the monopoly union
specication.
The sharing rule (7), which denes the workers share of the surplus still
holds with the exception that  is no longer constant at the equilibrium.
In addition to the negative direct e¤ect, the proportional tax rates s and t
now have an indirect e¤ect through , which may either mitigate or reinforce
the direct e¤ect. As for the per head tax g; there is still no direct e¤ect on
the workers share. However, a change in g does a¤ect the workers share
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indirectly through . Thus, the neutralityresult of the per head tax of the
previous section does not hold in the monopoly union set-up. We summarize
these ndings in the form of a proposition:
Proposition 2 In the model where a monopoly union maximizes the utility
of a median member, the e¤ects of either a proportional or per head labor
tax on reservation productivity R, labor market tightness  and the workers
share parameter  are a priori ambiguous. Di¤erent from the standard Nash
bargain model, the division of the match surplus between workers and rms
is not neutral with respect to a per head tax.
Proposition 2 spells out the fact that assuming a slightly di¤erent wage
setting mechanism has a considerable e¤ect on the implications of labor taxes
in the model. In the standard, decentralized Nash bargain model the behav-
ioral response to taxation is based on the workers and rms mutual interest
to avoid excess tax payments. In the present set-up, this consideration is ac-
companied by an upper level response by the union that perceives the e¤ects
of taxation on job creation and destruction. In the numerical simulations
we show that the latter response leads to a decline in  after a tax hike and
consequently, more moderate increase in the unemployment when compared
to the standard model.
2.6 E¢ ciency Wages
As another alternative mechanism of wage determination in the present
framework, we consider an e¢ ciency wage specication based on the well
known model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In this set-up, wage setting is
decentralized similar to the standard model of section 2.4 above. However,
di¤erent from the standard model, wage determination is based solely on the
consideration of the rm. To develop this idea further, we start with the
model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and extend it by the introduction
of labor taxation. As an essential feature of the model, employed workers can
either exert e¤ort or shirk. Exerting e¤ort is costly in terms of lost leisure
and the workers need some incentive to do so. Because the productivity of
those supplying e¤ort is higher, it is in the interest of the rms that their
employees exert e¤ort. If a rm nds someone shirking, he or she will be
dismissed and will end up searching for a new job. However, monitoring is
costly and the rms must content with spot checks that only provide a pos-
itive probability of detecting a shirker. The solution to the problem is that
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rms end up paying a wage rate that makes the workers indi¤erent between
exerting e¤ort and shirking.
In this set-up, utilizing the notation introduced above and allowing for
the tax instruments as dened in (3), the valuation of a job by an employed
worker exerting e¤ort can be written as
rWe (x) = (1  t)w   g +  [UF (R) + Se (x) We (x)] (21)
where Si =
R 1
R
Wi (x) dF (x), i = e; s is the average value of a lled job for
a worker exerting e¤ort e and for a shirker s, respectively. Similarly, for an
employed worker not exerting e¤ort (shirker) we have
rWs (x) = (1  t)w   g + e+  [UF (R) + Ss (x) Ws (x)]
+ (U  Ws (x)) (22)
where e is the value of the extra leisure from not exerting e¤ort and  is the
monitoring frequency. According to (22), monitoring implies an increased
risk of becoming unemployed for a shirker as reected by the last term on
the right hand side.
Since all workers are identical, the value of unemployment search and
thus, the threat point, is equal to all employed workers. Therefore, there
is no need for the rm to di¤erentiate wages according to job productivity
and the wage rate will be uniform across jobs, as we already anticipated
in the notation in equations (21) and (22). Consequently, the valuation
of a job for a worker only depends on whether he or she exerts e¤ort i.e.
Wi (x) = Wi;8x; i = e; s. Imposing indi¤erence between exerting e¤ort and
shirkingWe = Ws = W into (21) and (22) then yields the no-shirking
condition
e =  (W   U) (23)
According to (23), the worker is indi¤erent between working and shirking if
the disutility of e¤ort is just equal to the expected loss from shirking. Notice
that (21) can now be rewritten as
rW = (1  t)w   g + F (R) (U  W ) (24)
For the value of unemployment search, recall (1) to derive
rU = b+m () (W   U) (25)
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where, for simplicity, we have set a = 0 i.e. abstracted from the separate
search cost15. The e¢ ciency wage can then be solved from (23), (24) and
(25) to get
w =
b+ g
1  t +
e (r +  () + F (R))
 (1  t) (26)
According to (26), wages depend positively on both labor market tightness
 and reservation productivity R. Intuitively, labor market tightness puts
an upward pressure on wages because nding another job becomes easier for
a potential shirker. Wages increase in reservation productivity because jobs
became more insecure with higher R: Furthermore, for given labor market
tightness and reservation productivity, wages decrease in the monitoring fre-
quency  and increase in the value of extra leisure to a shirker e as well as
in the proportional and per head income taxes, t and g. Slightly rearranging
(26) shows that for given labor market tightness and reservation productiv-
ity, the after tax wage (1  t)w   g is independent of the taxes. Intuitively,
as long as the threat point of a potential shirker has not changed, the af-
ter tax remuneration needed to attract e¤ort is invariable. Whether after
tax wages increase or decrease after a tax hike thus depends on the indirect
e¤ects through  and R:
In the e¢ ciency wage set up, there is no mutual acceptance of job de-
struction, but the decision is based on the consideration of the rm. With
the zero prot condition (9) binding, the reservation productivity is thus de-
termined by the condition J (R) = 0. Substituting wage equation (26) in
(A.2) under (9) and rearranging gives
(r + ) J (x) = x  (1 + s)

b+ g
1  t +
e (r +  () + F (R))
q (1  t)

+ SJ (27)
which corresponds to (B.2) in the basic model. Developing a Taylor series
around J (R) = 0 yields
J (x) =
1
r + 
(x R) (28)
Applying (27) to x = R and further substituting (28) for J (z) gives
(1 + s)
1  t

b+ g +
e
q
(r +  () + F (R))

=

r + 
Z 1
R
(z  R) dF (z) +R
(29)
15This assumption is made to simplify the notation and does not a¤ect the key results.
18
which is the job destruction condition in the e¢ ciency wage model and con-
stitutes an upward sloping schedule in the (;R)-space by an appropriate
choice of the exogenous parameters 16. To derive another independent equa-
tion in the two unknowns, rst notice that with (9) binding, (4) still implies
(B.6). Then, apply (28) to x = 1 and substitute (B.6) for the value of a job
to get
c =
(1 R)
r + 
q () (30)
which is the job creation condition in the e¢ ciency wage model and consti-
tutes a downward sloping curve in (;R) -space.
By inspecting the equilibrium conditions, it is easy to see that the equiv-
alence of the proportional income tax and the payroll tax still holds as long
as the rates are chosen such that (1 + s) = (1  t) 1. Furthermore, in the
e¢ ciency wage set-up, the proportional income tax is equivalent to the per
head tax as long as rates are chosen such that g = tw 17.
The e¢ ciency wage equilibrium with taxes is the tuple (R; ) dened by
the intersection of curves (29) and (30). Similar to the basic model with
the Nash bargain over wages, tax parameters only enter the job destruction
condition (29). Di¤erentiating (29) shows that an increase in any of the tax
parameters causes a shift up and to the left for the job destruction curve.
Since the job creation schedule remains stable, higher taxes unambiguously
cause an increase in the reservation productivity and a decline in the labor
market tightness. By (8), this implies a higher steady state rate of unem-
ployment.
It is worth noting that combining (23), (9) and (B.3) we can derive the
following expression for the workers share of the surplus in the e¢ ciency
wage equilibrium
W   U
J (x)  V +W   U =

1 +
q (x R)
e (r + )
 1
(31)
16Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) have shown that generally the job destruction sched-
ule may be non-monotonic in the case of e¢ cency wages and therefore multiple equilibria
may arise.
17This can be veried by imposing t = 0 and g = t0w into (26) and (29); the resulting
equilibrium will be identical to the case where t = t0 and g = 0: It has been shown in
models not allowing for search behaviour that the equivalence of proportional and per
head taxes is a special feature of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, which does not necessarily
hold in more versatile extensions of the e¢ ciency wage models (e.g. Pisauro, 1991 and
Rasmussen, 1998).
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According to (31), the workers share increases in R. For a given workers
share, a higher reservation productivity makes jobs more risky thereby re-
ducing the utility di¤erence between employment and unemployment workers
and the expected loss from shirking. The satisfaction of no shirking condition
then requires that the workers share increases with the reservation produc-
tivity.
Expression (31) reveals that the tax rates a¤ect the workers relative
share only indirectly through the reservation productivity R, which - as ar-
gued above - increases with any one of the three tax parameters. Since
the workers share increases in R, as shown by (31), we can conclude that
higher taxes increase the workers relative share of the surplus in the e¢ -
ciency wage specication. As for the wages, equation (26) reveals that the
induced changes in the endogenous variables by a tax hike (higher R and
lower ) cause two opposite e¤ects on the after tax wage. Consequently, the
overall e¤ect of taxation on take-home pay is ambiguous18. These ndings
can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 In the model where wages are determined according to a
standard e¢ ciency wage rule, an increase in proportional or per head la-
bor tax causes an increase in the reservation productivity R and a decline
in the labor market tightness . Consequently, workers share of the match
surplus and equilibrium unemployment increase, but the e¤ect on the after
tax wage is a priori ambiguous.
The nding that higher labor taxes increase the workers share of the
match surplus in the e¢ ciency wage specication is in clear contrast to the
two models involving wage bargaining analyzed in the previous sections. The
wage moderation e¤ect of proportional tax inherent to the bargaining models
does not arise in the e¢ ciency wage set-up where wage setting is driven by
the no-shirking condition and taxes are borne by the rms.
3 Numerical Simulations
In the previous section we noticed that the e¤ects of taxation di¤er consid-
erably depending on the prevailing wage setting mechanism. However, the
18It turns out in the numerical simulations that the e¤ect through lower labour market
tightness dominates and the after tax wage drops if taxes are increased in the e¢ ciency
wage set-up.
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direction of the deviation of the wage and employment response was in most
cases ambiguous. In this section we use numerical simulations to derive more
specic employment responses to changes in the tax policy under the three
alternative models of wage setting. The method also allows us to compare
the magnitude of the tax e¤ects in the di¤erent models.
To enable simulations, we specify the functional form of the matching
function and the distribution of the productivity shock. In particular, we
assume Cobb-Douglas matching technology m ()   and an evenly dis-
tributed productivity shock in the interval ]0; 1[ (see Appendix C). We then
choose some plausible numerical values for the exogenous parameters of the
model.
Before turning to the simulations, we derive formulas for a few aggregate
variables that will be useful in reporting the simulation results. Let us rst
dene the unemployment incidence as I  F (R) and the expected duration
of an unemployment spell as D   . According to (8) the steady state
unemployment depends positively on the unemployment incidence and on
the expected duration of an unemployment spell. To develop a measure for
the overall e¢ ciency, we notice that the steady state aggregate income net
of search and recruiting costs y can be dened as
y =

F (R) +
Z 1
R
xdF (x)

(1  u) + (b  a  c)u (32)
where the rst term on the right hand side denes the total product in steady
state with F (R) representing the fraction of matches of type x = 1. Finally,
the total tax revenue (see Appendix D for the details) collected by the three
taxes is given by:
T =

(1  )
1  t (b  a+ g) +

1 + s

c + 1  1
2
(1 R)2

(t+ s) + g

 (1  u) (33)
In choosing the values for the exogenous parameters there are potentially
two alternative paths to follow. One could choose the exogenous parameters
of the model to reect the stylized facts of some particular economy as for
instance in Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Holm et al. (1999). Instead,
we prefer using values that roughly correspond to the ones used in the earlier
studies of policy impact by Pissarides (1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) and referring to a "stylized economy". Following the common practice,
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we set the matching function elasticity parameter  so as to satisfy the Hosios
condition in the case of a symmetric Nash bargain ( = 0:5). The quarterly
discount rate r is taken to be 1 per cent. The value of leisure b is set at
0:6 to reect the average replacement ratio provided by the unemployment
insurance. The remaining parameter values are adjusted so as to produce a
reasonably low unemployment rate (1:5 per cent) at the no-tax benchmark
of the Nash bargain model. The extra parameters of the monopoly union
model (median worker productivity xm) and e¢ ciency wage model (value
of extra leisure e and monitoring frequency ) are then chosen so that the
unemployment rate with no taxes in these models is close to that in the
Nash bargain model. The exact parameter values used in the simulations are
presented in Table 1.
Table 1: The parameter values used in the model simulations. a is the
search cost per period, b is the value of leisure gross of search cost, c is the
per period cost of holding a vacancy, r is the (quarterly) rate of discount, s
is the payroll tax,  is the matching elasticity parameter,  is frequency of
a productivity shock, xm is the productivity of the median worker, e is the
value of extra leisure for a shirker and  is the monitoring frequency of the
rm.
a b c r s   xm e 
0.2 0.6 0.2 0.01 0.0 0.5 0.03 0.98 0.1 0.5
3.1 Proportional and per Head Taxation
Let us rst consider the e¤ect of an exogenous increase in the proportional
tax rate on labor income19. The results of a simulation where a 10 per cent
tax on labor income was introduced are presented in Table 2, along the rows
with t = 0:1; g = 0. The job creation rate is reduced and the introduction
taxation leads to longer unemployment spells (D > 0). At the same time,
the reservation productivity increases, causing more job destruction at a
given level of employment. This quantitatively weaker e¤ect, is reected in
the higher unemployment incidence (I > 0).
The two e¤ects are qualitatively similar irrespective of the model speci-
cation. However, the magnitude of the employment e¤ects di¤er depending
19Since - as predicted by the analytical results - the e¤ects of a proportional payroll tax
s are identical to the e¤ects of t;we focus only to the latter in the simulations.
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on the wage setting mechanism. In the e¢ ciency wage model the e¤ects are
much larger than in the models with wage bargaining. This reects the fact
derived above in Section 2.6 that labor taxes increase the workers share of
the surplus in the e¢ ciency wage model, thus promoting a stronger response
of wages to a tax hike.
Table 2: Results from the simulations where either proportional or per
head income taxation was introduced at rate t = 0:1 or g = 0:1, respectively.
D is the average duration of unemployment spells, I is unemployment in-
cidence and u is unemployment rate. The symbol  refers to a percentage
change.
t g D I u
E¢ ciency wage 0:1 0:0 33:2 0:4 33:5
0:0 0:1 34:1 0:3 34:3
Monopoly union 0:1 0:0 3:6 0:1 3:5
0:0 0:1 8:5 0:25 8:6
Nash bargain ( = 0:5) 0:1 0:0 4:0 0:1 4:1
0:0 0:1 9:8 0:25 9:9
In the monopoly union and Nash bargaining models, the wage and em-
ployment responses are much more modest, owing to the wage moderation
e¤ect inherent in wage bargaining discussed above in Section 2.3. A higher
proportional tax rate reduces the workers share of the surplus which facil-
itates a moderate wage response. In the monopoly union set-up this e¤ect
is by a downward adjustment of . Accordingly, the negative employment
e¤ect is smallest in the monopoly union model.
The e¤ects of an increase in the per head tax g, presented in Table 2
along the rows with t = 0:1; g = 0, are qualitatively similar to those of
the proportional tax. The di¤erence to the proportional tax is that the
wage and employment response in the models with wage bargaining is now
clearly stronger and quantitatively closer to the e¢ ciency wage model. As
noticed above in sections 2.3 and 2.4, a per head income tax does not directly
reduce the workers share of the match surplus in the models involving wage
bargaining. It does so, however, indirectly through the lowered  in the
monopoly union specication. This is why the per head tax has a relatively
strong e¤ect on unemployment in the Nash bargaining model and a little
weaker e¤ect in the monopoly union specication.
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3.2 Progressive Taxation
To compare the response of the alternative wage determination models to tax
progression, we simulated a simultaneous introduction of proportional wage
tax (t = 0:1) and a per head tax credit or subsidy, g < 0. The size of the
subsidy was adjusted to just exhaust the revenue raised by the proportional
tax. Thus, the net revenue raised by the tax system is zero, implying dT = 0.
This set-up enables us to focus on the e¤ects of pure progression of the tax
system20.
The results from the balanced budget simulations are presented in Table
3. As discussed above in section 2.6 the two taxes are essentially identical
in the e¢ ciency wage set-up. Since the balanced budget constraint implies
g =  tw, a pure increase in progression has no e¤ect on the labor market
equilibrium in this case.
Table 3: Results from the simulations where progressive income taxation
was introduced in a revenue neutral manner. D is the average duration of
unemployment spells, I is unemployment incidence, u is unemployment rate
and y aggregate income, reecting overall e¢ ciency. The symbol  refers to
a percentage change.
t g D I u y
E¢ ciency wage 0:1  0:0985 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0
Monopoly union 0:1  0:0986  4:5  0:15  4:59 0:0
Nash bargain  = 0:5 0:1  0:0986  5:13  0:15  5:18  0:004
Nash bargain  = 0:55 0:1  0:0987  5:14  0:15  5:19 0:008
In the Nash bargain and monopoly union models, a revenue neutral intro-
duction of progressive taxation evokes wage moderation and reduces unem-
ployment. The mechanisms behind the result are essentially those discussed
above, in section 3.1 with the exception that g is now a per head employ-
ment subsidy rather than a tax. The upward adjustment of  mitigates the
negative wage response in the monopoly union case and leaves the positive
employment e¤ect somewhat smaller than in the standard Nash bargain case.
As for the e¤ect on aggregate output, it is worth noticing that despite the
improved employment, e¢ ciency drops in the Nash bargain model (third row
of Table 3). This is a reection of the fact discussed above in Section 2.4 that
20For simplicity, our starting point is the no tax equilibrium of each model, but the
results should be applicable to cases with pre-existing (proportional) taxes as well.
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if no tax equilibriumsatises the Hosios condition, the e¢ ciency cannot
be improved. This is exactly the case in our model if  = 0:5 and  = 0:5.
However, this does not hold in a second bestsituation, where  6= 1 ; as
demonstrated in the nal row of Table 3 showing the simulation results from
the Nash bargain model with  = 0:55. In this case, unemployment is too
high in the initial equilibrium and e¢ ciency improves after the introduction
of taxation.
Finally, we notice that the policy package involving an increase in both
the proportional tax and in the per head transfer a¤ects workers di¤erently
depending on the productivity of their current job. As for the take-home
pay of the workers, (1  t)w (x)   g, the wage related part declines and
the per head part increases for any level of productivity. Because of the
revenue neutrality, the two e¤ects break even on average. Consequently, a
threshold level of productivity exists at which the take-home pay remains
unchanged after the introduction of the policy. For workers in jobs with
productivity lower than the threshold, after tax wages will increase. Similarly,
for workers with productivity higher than the threshold, after tax incomes
will decline. Thus, the revenue neutral introduction of progressive taxation
serves to improve the relative position of workers in the low productivity
jobs. Moreover, the induced reduction in the reservation productivity R
implies that jobs with lower than before productive will become protable.
Thus, the tax policy serves to widen the range of protable jobs towards the
less productive occupations.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have considered the e¤ects of labor taxation and tax progression in an
equilibrium model of the labor market with endogenous job creation and job
destruction. To focus especially on the role of wage setting, we embedded
three alternative models of wage determination: in addition to the standard
decentralized Nash bargain we considered the monopoly union and e¢ ciency
wage specications originating from Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). The
analytical results were complemented by numerical simulations of the result-
ing three distinctive models.
In all model specications, the e¤ects of a proportional income tax turned
out to be equivalent to a proportional payroll tax and independent of the
nominal incidence. Increases in either proportional or per head taxation have
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an adverse e¤ect on employment at two separate margins: less vacancies are
posted and more jobs are terminated. Our numerical simulations suggest
that the former e¤ect tends to be stronger and labor taxation is reected
mainly in the prolonged spells of unemployment. At the same time, the
magnitude of the negative employment e¤ects are smaller in the models with
wage bargaining in comparison to the e¢ ciency wage specication. This
nding reects the fact that higher taxes lead to a reduction of the workers
share of the match surplus in the bargaining models, but to an increase in
that share in the e¢ ciency wage specication.
Finally, we combine the two tax instruments in a revenue neutral manner
to enable a pure increase in the tax progression. We nd that the increased
progression of labor taxes may improve employment with low or even non-
existent e¢ ciency cost if wages are set in a bargaining framework. Moreover,
we argue that in these models, increased progression increases the take-home
pay of low-productivity workers and promotes the emergence of less produc-
tive jobs. In the e¢ ciency wage set-up a pure increase in tax progression is
neutral in terms of employment.
Despite the somewhat di¤erent framework, our results are broadly in line
with those of Pissarides (1998), who suggests that a revenue- neutral increase
in the tax progression comes close to a free lunch. From the policy point
of view, our ndings might provide another justication for the tax reforms
that aim to mitigate the tax burden of the low-income workers in Europe
by introducing tax exemptions and increasing the lower limit for taxable in-
come. Furthermore, to the extent that the European labor market can be
characterized by wage bargaining and the U.S. by e¢ ciency wage pay setting,
our results shed some light to the relationship between taxation and employ-
ment in international comparisons such as Prescott (2004). According to our
results, labor taxation and tax progression are less harmful to employment
in the set-up where wages are bargained over. This is especially so, if some
collective, economy wide institutions like trade unions are involved in the
wage setting21. Therefore, European economies may be capable of dealing
with a higher tax burden with less damage to employment compared to the
countries with a more competitive wage setting. A corollary to this idea is
that tax cuts would not boost employment that strongly in Europe and the
21This conjecture nds some support in the recent empirical ndings suggesting that
the employment e¤ects of labour taxes tend to be smaller in the corporatist economies
(Daveri and Tabellini, 2000, Kiander et al, 2004).
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policies directed to bring employment to the U.S. level should therefore not
put too much hope on lower taxation.
A Derivation of the Nash Wage Rule
First notice that (2) can be written as
W (x) =
(1  t)w (x)  g +  (UF (R) + SW )
r + 
(A.1)
where R is the endogenous reservation productivity to be determined below
and SW =
R 1
R
W (z)F (z) is the average value for a worker of a lled job.
Similarly, we can rewrite (5) as
J (x) =
x  (1 + s)w (x) +  (V F (R) + SJ)
r + 
(A.2)
where SJ =
R 1
R
J (z)F (z) is the average value for the rm of a lled job. The
wage rate is determined as a solution to the problem (6) in the main text. To
derive the rst order condition of the problem, di¤erentiate the right hand
side of (6) with respect to w (x) and set equal to zero to get
 (J (x)  V ) 
W + (1  ) (W (x)  U) 
J = 0 (A.3)
where 
W =
@(W (x) U)
@w(x)
and 
J =
@(J(x) V )
@w(x)
and bothW (x) U and J (x) V
are assumed to be strictly positive. Utilizing the formulas (1), (4), (A.1) and
(A.2) we can derive expressions for the two derivatives as follows: 
W = 1 tr+
and 
J =  1+sr+ . Substituting these in (A.3) and some manipulation then
yields (7) in the main text.
B Derivation of the Equilibrium with Taxes
Substitution of (A.1), (A.2) and (9) in the wage rule (7) and solving explicitly
for the wage rate yields
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w (x) =
x
1 + s
+
1  
1  t (rU + g) (B.1)
which shows that the wage rate is a weighted average of the fall back position
of the worker, rU , and the productivity of a match x, both of which are
corrected for the relevant taxes. Substituting this in (A.2), under (9) and
rearranging then gives
(r + ) J (x) = (1  )x  1 + s
1  t (1  ) (rU + g) + SJ (B.2)
To get a more convenient expression for the value of a lled job, we notice
that J (x) is linear in x and develop the Taylor series around J (R) = 0 to
get
J (x) =
1  
r + 
(x R) (B.3)
Applying (B.2) at the level of reservation productivity (x = R) and further
substituting (B.3) for J (z) yields
rU + g =
(1  t)R
(1 + s)
+
(1  t) 
(1 + s) (r + )
Z 1
R
(z  R) dF (z) (B.4)
To express the left hand side more conveniently, apply the wage equation (7)
to x = 1 with (9) binding to get
W (1) = U +
(1  t) 
(1 + s) (1  )J (1) (B.5)
Then notice that with (9) binding, (4) implies
J (1) =
c
q ()
(B.6)
which shows that for a given labor market tightness, the value of a new match
increases in the recruiting cost, c:
To derive another independent equation in the two unknowns, apply (B.3)
to x = 1 and substitute (B.6) for the value of a job to get (12) in the main
text. Then, substituting (B.5) and (B.6) in (1) yields
rU = b  a+ (1  t) c
(1  ) (1 + s) (B.7)
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where we utilized q =  1m (). Substituting (B.7) in (B.4) gives equation
(11) in the main text. Also notice that substituting (B.7) in (B.1) yields yet
another useful form of the wage equation
w (x) = (1  ) b  a+ g
1  t + 
x+ c
1 + s
(B.8)
which shows the dependency of wages (for given labor market tightness) on
the value of leisure b search cost a and the cost of holding a vacancy c. Wages
depend positively on the labor market tightness, because the expected cost
for the rm to nd another match increases.
C Distribution of the Productivity Shock
Assume productivity shock is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1].
Then f (z) = 1 and, consequently, we haveZ 1
R
(z  R) dF (z) =
Z 1
R
(z  R) dz = 1
2
(1 R)2
Furthermore,
F (R) =
Z R
0
dz = R
and Z 1
R
zdF (z) =
Z 1
R
zdz =
1 R2
2
D Tax Revenues at the Steady State
First notice that the stock of matches with productivity x = 1; n1 evolves
according to
dn1
dt
= m ()u  1 (1  u) (1  F (R))  1 (1  u)F (R)
where 1 is the share of matches with productivity x = 1 of all matches. The
three terms on the right hand side represent creation of new jobs, revaluation
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of jobs with x = 1 and destruction of jobs with x = 1; respectively. Setting
the right hand side equal to zero and solving for 1 yields
1 =
m ()u
 (1  u) = F (R)
where the second equality follows from (8) holding in the steady state. Next,
consider the revenue from the labor income tax at the steady state. For the
proportional part, the revenue is given by
Tt =

w(1)F (R) +
Z 1
R
w(z)dF (z)

(1  u) t (D.1)
For the constant part the revenue is simply given by
Tg = (1  u) g (D.2)
Substituting (B.8) for w (x) and utilizing f(x) = 1 and F (R) = R (see
Appendix C) we get
Z 1
R
w(x)dF (x) = (1 R)

1  
1  t (b  a+ g) +

1 + s

c +
1 +R
2

Substituting this in (D.1) and applying (B.8) for w (1) then yields
Tt =

1  
1  t (b  a+ g) +

1 + s

c + 1  1
2
(1 R)2

(1  u) t (D.3)
Repeating similar procedure for the payroll tax yields
Ts =

1  
1  t (b  a+ g) +

1 + s

c + 1  1
2
(1 R)2

(1  u) s (D.4)
Combining (D.2), (D.3) and (D.4), the total revenue T = Tt+Tg+Ts becomes
as expressed by (33) in the main text.
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